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ARTICLE  
Reforming the International  
Investment Law System 
SIMON LESTER
†
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Free trade and trade agreements have a perception problem these 
days: critics say they are designed for the benefit of big corporations, 
and that trade’s negative impact on ordinary people is ignored.1  For 
the most part, this perception is false.  When tariffs and other 
protectionist trade barriers come down, companies are forced to 
compete.  There are winners and losers in the corporate world from 
this competition, but the biggest winners are consumers.2  It is 
ordinary people who experience the most significant economic gains 
from free trade.3 
 
 †   Simon Lester is a Trade Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute. 
 1.  See, e.g., Mark Weisbrot, Tricks of Free Trade, SIERRA MAG., 
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200109/weisbrot_printable.asp (“We give up our 
jobs and environmental safeguards for the greater glory of transnational 
corporations.”). 
 2.  As a leading economics textbook puts it: “[W]hen trade has opened up, and 
when each country concentrates on its area of comparative advantage, everyone is 
better off. . .  When borders are opened to international trade, the national income 
of each and every trading country rises. . . An ill-designed tariff or quota, far from 
helping consumers in a country, will instead reduce their real incomes by making 
imports expensive and by making the whole world less productive. Countries lose 
from protectionism because reduced international trade eliminates the efficiency 
inherent in specialization and division of labor.” PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM 
D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 904 (13th ed. 1989). 
 3.  See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, Exec. Office of 
the President, NAFTA Benefits (October 2007), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/N
AFTA%20Benefits.pdf. 
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There is one notable exception to this defense of trade 
agreements, however:  the international investment law system, 
which has been incorporated into trade agreements, gives special 
rights to sue governments exclusively to foreign investors.4  When 
you look around the world today, you see many people being treated 
badly by their own governments.  People who are being oppressed on 
the basis of their religion, race or gender; people whose property has 
been stolen; and people who are being treated unjustly for no 
apparent reason at all.  Do any of these ordinary people have access 
to enforceable international law to assert their rights against their own 
governments?  For the most part, they do not.  But foreign investors 
do. As a result, the criticism of trade agreements as constituting 
special favors for big corporations has some resonance when the 
investment law system is at issue. 
Some might argue that even if this criticism were true, there are 
benefits to this system, in the form of economic welfare gains that 
make the system worthwhile despite any appearance of bias.  In truth, 
such benefits have not been demonstrated.5 
In fact, the problem the system addresses has not even been 
defined.  What exactly is the problem that needs to be addressed by 
an elaborate system of investment obligations and international 
tribunals?  It turns out we do not really have a clear answer.  We are 
operating under assumptions from decades ago, which have not been 
adjusted as the world has changed. 
In this paper, I offer a critique of the existing system in three 
parts.  First, I question whether there is much of a problem with bad 
treatment of foreign investment by governments that needs to be 
addressed.  If actual treatment of foreign investors is generally good, 
concerted international action is unnecessary. Second, I argue that the 
nature of capital flows today means that referring to investment as 
“foreign” overlooks the reality of today’s interdependent economic 
world.  Globalization has led to transnational companies that operate 
 
 4.  These rights were originally found in bilateral investment treaties, but they 
have now spread to the investment chapters of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral 
trade agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement.  North 
American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 5.  See Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible 
Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign 
Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 827–28 (2008) (“While I find 
some tentative evidence that privatization programs and the World Bank’s 
investment insurance program may promote FDI, my results suggest that BITs have 
little or no impact on investment decisions . . .”).  
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around the world, and are not “foreign” and “domestic” in the sense 
they used to be. And, third, I explore the nature of the international 
judicial review that the international investment law system has made 
available, and ask whether we have gone too far in creating 
international “constitutional” courts.  Judicial review is well-accepted 
in the domestic sphere, but in the international context it is still novel 
and unexplored. 
Finally, I consider alternative approaches to addressing any 
problems that do arise in relation to the treatment of investment, such 
as improving the domestic law protections in nations where problems 
exist, and encouraging private companies to take on more 
responsibility for their own protection.  I conclude that the real issues 
that exist here can be dealt with in these more productive ways. 
II. IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH BAD TREATMENT OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT? 
If you look back at the situation of 100 years ago, or even 60 
years ago, foreign investors were often treated badly.  The world that 
existed at that time was much less democratic, with many 
authoritarian governments having shifting views on foreign 
investment, alternately encouraging it and then expropriating it.6  In 
the post-colonial world of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, economic 
nationalism was on the rise, and newly empowered developing 
nations began to take back what they believed was theirs.7  In many 
cases, this was accomplished through expropriation of physical 
assets.8  This era was a challenging one for Western multinationals 
who had invested in the developing world. 
To deal with this situation, these companies lobbied their own 
governments for international treaties that would give them recourse 
in neutral international courts, which could handle any disputes that 
arose.9  This approach appealed to the governments themselves, 
 
 6. One prominent example is the Mexican expropriation of foreign oil 
companies’ assets. See Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, Mexican 
Expropriation of Foreign Oil (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/mexican-oil/. 
 7.  Stephen J. Kobrin, Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms 
in LDCs: Trends from 1960-1979, 28 INT’L STUD. Q. 329, 344 (1984). 
 8.  Id.; See also J. Frederick Truitt, Expropriation of Foreign Investment: 
Summary of the Post World War II Experience of American and British Investors in 
the Less Developed Countries, 1 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 21, 23–30 (1970) (detailing 
expropriation and nationalization by sector). 
 9.  An early effort in this regard was the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of 
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which did not like having to engage in the diplomacy of defending 
their companies’ rights.10  In the 1960s and 1970s, templates for such 
treaties were developed and applied, and soon proliferated.  By 2012, 
there were nearly 3,200 agreements on foreign investment, either as 
free-standing treaties or chapters of trade agreements.11 
While this process was taking place, however, attitudes towards 
foreign investment changed in most of the world.  Economic 
nationalism faded and governments began to court investors.  Today, 
a typical story about large foreign investments will note the subsidies 
offered by the government to attract that investment.12 
To a great extent, then, bad treatment of foreign investment is a 
problem of an earlier era.  While there are a small number of nations 
which threaten expropriation or actually expropriate foreign 
investors’ property, the frequency of such acts is down 
considerably.13  According to one economist, the number of direct 
expropriation acts was 136 in the 1960s and 423 in the 1970s, but has 
since declined to only 17 in the 1980s, 22 in the 1990s, and 27 
instances in the 2000s, through 2006.14 
In the face of this empirical data, it is not completely clear what 
the problem is that the investment law system seeks to address.  If 
 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.  See Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, ch. 1, § 1, art. 1,  Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (“The 
purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of 
investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting 
States in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.”) [hereinafter ICSID 
Convention]. 
 10.  Prior to the ICSID Convention, the traditional view was that States alone 
had jurisdiction to approach an international tribunal.  P. F. Sutherland, The World 
Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 28 INT’L & COMP. L.Q., 
367, 372 (1979). 
 11.  U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 
18, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2013/2 (2014) [hereinafter UNCTAD]. 
 12.  As a recent example, Alabama provided $158 million in financial and 
logistical support to attract an Airbus manufacturing plant.  Jon Ostrower, Alabama 
Puts Airbus Incentives at $158 Million, WALL ST. J., Jul. 9, 2012, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304022004577516922037292712.  
Overall, U.S. state and local government subsidies have increased from $26.4 
billion in 1996 to $46.8 billion in 2005.  Emerging countries such as Brazil, China, 
Vietnam, and India also provide significant investment subsidies.  KENNETH P. 
THOMAS, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND THE GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR CAPITAL 2 
(2011). 
 13.  See Christopher Hajzler, Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investments: 
Sectoral Patterns from 1993 to 2006, 148 REV. WORLD ECON. 119, 127–28 (2012). 
 14.  Id. 
06 - LESTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2015  10:34 AM 
74 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30 
expropriation is rare today, what exactly is the problem?  And where 
is it a problem?  This issue has simply not been studied.  With no data 
on the nature and extent of the problems faced by foreign investors, it 
is hard to craft appropriate rules to address such problems.  What we 
do know is that, a few outliers aside, direct expropriation has greatly 
diminished as an issue faced by investors.  Beyond expropriation, 
investment rules also require fair and equitable treatment.  But to 
what degree do investors face treatment that is not “fair” or 
“equitable”?  And what kind of treatment is this exactly?  These 
terms are so broad and vague that is hard to say with any certainty 
what government behavior is at issue here.15 
Staying with the world of data, despite arguments that 
investment obligations help “promote” foreign investment, the 
evidence on this point is mixed.  Examinations of the impact of such 
rules on investment flows are not supportive of the claimed benefits.16  
And some countries, such as Brazil, which is famously resistant to 
investment treaties,17 have had no problem attracting investment.18 
In reality, the biggest problem in the world of foreign 
investment may not be bad treatment, but treatment that is too good 
to these investors: subsidies.  As noted, subsidies to attract foreign 
investors have proliferated.19  If there is a problem with foreign 
 
 15.  See, e.g., UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on 
Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 1–12, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DIA/IA/2011/5 (2012) (“the vague and broad wording of the obligation 
carries a risk of an overreach in its application”; “The vagueness of the FET 
standard is at the core of the problem”; “the legal building blocks for the analysis of 
the international minimum standard and its role in international investment law are 
precarious and often incomplete, vague and contested”; “It has even been suggested 
that due to its extreme vagueness the FET obligation lacks legitimacy as a legal 
norm”). 
 16.  See Yackee, supra note 5; Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative 
Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 399 (2010). (“[S]cholars have not yet been able to 
provide anything close to a definitive answer of whether BITs indeed achieve their 
central purpose: increased flows of investment.”). 
 17.  See Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 269 n.19 
(2008) (“Brazil did not sign a BIT until 1994, and none of its ten bilateral 
agreements had entered into force as of the late 1990s.”). 
 18.  Brazil is ranked number twelve worldwide in “stock of direct foreign 
investment – at home.” Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2198rank. 
html?countryname=Brazil&countrycode=br&regionCode=soa&rank=12#br. 
 19.  See Kenneth Thomas, Commentary, Investment Incentives and the Global 
Competition for Capital, COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, No. 54, Dec. 30, 2011, 
available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_54.pdf (“Investment 
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investment that needs to be addressed, it is this one.  When 
governments use subsidies to compete for investment, no new 
investment is created.  The only impact is to shift investment around 
from location to location, in a way that benefits the large corporations 
who receive these subsidies. 
III. IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD, WHAT IS “FOREIGN” INVESTMENT? 
A hundred years ago, the global economy could much more 
easily be divided along national lines.  Many companies had a clear 
nationality, and when they invested their money abroad, they 
maintained that nationality to a great extent.20  Foreign investment 
typically meant big Western companies investing in developing 
countries, often in the natural resource sector (and this is where 
problems with bad treatment typically arose).21 
The modern economy looks different from this older period. 
Today’s foreign investment flows in much more varied ways. It is not 
just Western companies investing in the developing world. It is a 
wide range of companies of many nationalities, investing all over the 
world and creating global supply chains and operations.22 Companies 
might have their headquarters in one country, develop technology in 
another, raise capital around the world, and produce their goods in 
multiple countries. And the nationality of the owners might not match 
up with any of these countries. 
In this light, the notions of “foreign” and “domestic” investment 
have much less meaning than they once did. It is thus misleading to 
think about investors as having a particular nationality, e.g., as 
“American” or “Korean” or “Mexican.” While particular companies 
 
incentives (subsidies designed to affect the location of investment) are a pervasive 
feature of global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). They are used by 
the vast majority of countries, at multiple levels of government, in a broad range of 
industries.”). 
 20.  For example, the United Fruit Company (Chiquita) or the American Sugar 
Refining Company (Domino), which operated in the Caribbean and Latin America.  
See Marcelo Bucheli, Multinational Corporations, Totalitarian Regimes and 
Economic Nationalism: United Fruit Company in Central America, 1899-1975, 50 
BUS. HISTORY 433, 434 (2008) (discussing the relationship between multinational 
corporations and dictators in Central America). 
 21.  Id. at 437. 
 22.  Ford Motor Co., Form 10-K (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), 
http://corporate.ford.com/doc/sr13-form-10-k.pdf [hereinafter Ford Motor Co.]; 
Toyota Motor Corp., Form 20-F (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.toyota-
global.com/investors/ir_library/sec/pdf/20-F_201403_final.pdf [hereinafter Toyota 
Motor Corp.]. 
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may have a majority of shareholders who are citizens of a given 
country, or may have their headquarters in a particular jurisdiction, 
transnational corporations are fundamentally “citizens of the world.” 
Their owners can and do move production and other operations to 
wherever they perceive to be the best location. 
To take some examples from the auto industry, in the practice of 
U.S. trade and investment policy, Ford is considered an “American” 
company, and the U.S. government often negotiates on its behalf in 
trade and investment agreements.23 But does it make sense to think of 
Ford this way? Total U.S. employment for Ford in the manufacturing 
sector is about 43,000, but Ford employs more than 145,000 people 
worldwide in 55 different production facilities.24  Along the same 
lines, Toyota is thought of a “Japanese” company. While there are 
over 140,000 employees in Japan, Toyota has overseas employment 
of close to 200,000. It has factories in North America, Latin America, 
Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Middle East.25 
Clearly, both of these companies operate globally and are not 
purely “American” or “Japanese.” The question thus arises: should 
the historical origin of a corporation or the nationality of its 
shareholders really play such a decisive role in the legal treatment of 
these corporations under international investment law? Why should 
the U.S. government push for protections for Ford abroad but not 
Toyota abroad? The nationality-based approach to the protections 
offered under these treaties does not reflect the way many companies 
operate in today’s investment world. 
To take an example from recent headlines, Burger King recently 
merged with the Canadian donut company Tim Horton’s and, in the 
process, became part of a parent company based in Canada.26  Now 
that Burger King has become an investment of a “Canadian” 
corporation (i.e., the parent company), can it sue the U.S. government 
under the NAFTA investment rules27 if a future Mayor Bloomberg 
were to mandate size limits on donuts because of health concerns?  
 
 23.  See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE U.S.-SOUTH KOREA 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (KORUS FTA): PROVISIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 3 n.3 
(Sept. 16, 2014) (discussing an automotive trade commitment reached by the U.S. 
and South Korea that was a priority for the Ford Motor Co.). 
 24.  Ford Motor Co., supra note 22. 
 25.  Toyota Motor Corp., supra note 22. 
 26.  Liz Hoffman & Dana Mattioli, Burger King in Talks to Buy Tim Hortons in 
Canada Tax Deal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/burger-king-in-talks-to-buy-tim-hortons-1408924294. 
 27.  NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1116. 
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This example shows that the formal nationality of companies has 
become increasingly arbitrary over the years and does not serve as a 
good basis for imposing investment obligations on governments. 
IV. WHAT SCOPE FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW? 
International investment obligations provide for the judicial 
review of domestic laws, regulation, and other government measures.  
This proposition is controversial,28 because it allows international 
courts to interfere with democratic decision-making.  However, the 
extent of the controversy depends on the scope of the obligations.  
Such obligations can be narrowly drawn to target specific kinds of 
actions, such as protection of domestic industries.  Or they can be 
more wide-ranging and open-ended, along the lines of rights-based 
judicial review as seen in the domestic constitutional law context.29  I 
argue in this section that a focus on non-discrimination can be 
politically workable, but more expansive obligations such as “fair and 
equitable” treatment are not appropriate. 
Non-discrimination is at the core of international economic 
relations.30  It includes both national treatment, which means not 
discriminating against foreign goods, services, or capital; and most 
favored nation treatment, which means not discriminating among 
goods, services, or capital of different nations.  Such a rule promotes 
good international relations and good economics; without a non-
discrimination norm, protectionist measures can proliferate and 
economic alliances can stand in the way of peaceful trade relations. 
A non-discrimination rule is narrow and bounded.  Under such 
an obligation, a government can regulate however it likes, and based 
on whatever policy it chooses, as long as the measure is non-
discriminatory.  For example, a government could require that 
automobiles have a certain level of fuel efficiency, but it could not 
impose harsher requirements on foreign-made cars than domestic-
 
 28.  One need only look at the Australian plain packaging complaint to see the 
depth of the strong feelings about this issue.  Cigarette maker Philip Morris 
International has challenged an Australian law that requires cigarette producers to 
sell cigarettes in plain packaging.  See Rebecca Thurlow, Australian Cigarette-
Packaging Curbs Prompt Suit, 
WALL ST. J., Nov 21, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702044
43404577051361355154868. 
 29.  The fair and equitable treatment and expropriation provisions fall into this 
category. 
 30.  JOHN H. JACKSON ET. AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 537 (5th ed. 2008). 
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made ones. 
By contrast, international obligations relating to subjects such as 
direct expropriation, indirect expropriation, and “fair and equitable 
treatment” are much broader.  They all have parallels in domestic 
constitutional and administrative law, and, at least in theory, offer a 
form of these protections as international law.  That causes a much 
broader intrusion into domestic, democratic decision-making, and is 
the source of much of the criticism of the investment law system. 
“Fair and equitable” treatment in particular has been the subject 
of much criticism in the context of the investment system.31  
Concerns about its scope have led governments to try to put 
boundaries on it.32  However, these attempts do not show much 
promise.  A recent effort by the European Union and Canada as part 
of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
leaves us with obligations that still look quite broad and undefined.  
The CETA includes “manifest arbitrariness” and “fundamental 
breach of due process” as examples of such treatment.33  
Unfortunately, such terms raise more questions about the scope of the 
obligations than they answer.  What exactly are the limits of these 
obligations?  What types of government actions might violate them?  
No doubt creative lawyers are already thinking about the possibilities, 
even before the CETA is signed. 
International judicial review is not objectionable in and of itself, 
of course.  Specific proposals for such review should be considered 
on their merits. But the nature of the obligations, the parties which 
have access to legal recourse under them, and how and by what 
means they are enforced, needs to be considered carefully as part of 
the debate over the scope and nature of the international legal system.  
Having open-ended provisions that are available only to foreign 
investors contributes to the perception that international economic 
 
 31.  UNCTAD, supra note 15. 
 32.  One example is the NAFTA parties’ attempt to clarify the minimum 
standard of treatment in 2001.  See International Institute For Sustainable 
Development, Note on NAFTA Commission’s July 31, 2001, Initiative to Clarify 
Chapter 11 Investment Provisions, (last visited Mar. 13, 2015),  
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2001/trade_nafta_aug2001.pdf (“This broad interpretation 
of minimum standards of treatment—essentially giving firms the right to litigate 
any international law obligation—has not been seen outside [o]f the NAFTA 
context.  The statement puts an end to this.  It brings us back to an 
interpretation . . .that corresponds to customary international law . . . .”).  
 33.  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. X.9, Oct. 
18, 2013, Consolidated CETA Text, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf. 
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law is a corporate handout, with ordinary people ignored.34 
V. CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVE WAYS FORWARD 
To a great extent, we have been stuck in the same debate for 
decades: do investment obligations, as currently written, promote and 
protect foreign investment, as supporters say?  Or do they give 
corporations special rights and undermine the state’s sovereign 
regulatory and legislative powers, as critics allege?  It would be 
helpful to step outside this all or nothing dichotomy and think 
critically about some of the more specific issues that arise in this 
context. 
First, it would be a great idea for investment generally, both 
foreign and domestic, if we could elevate property rights and 
discourage expropriation.  Unfortunately, current efforts in the 
international arena are weak and isolated.  These rights are only 
provided to a limited group (that is, to foreign investors) and under an 
uncertain and unpredictable quasi-judicial framework.  If we want 
property rights to be taken seriously, we need to promote them as a 
matter of domestic law, rather than offer an ad hoc system only to 
foreign investors.  A treaty could help in this regard, if it established 
global minimum standards and required their adoption in domestic 
 
 34.  Even domestic investors do not have the protections given to their foreign 
counterparts.  The Economist recently reported on a Chinese hotel owner whose 
property was taken by local Chinese government authorities: 
Mr Qiao says he was abducted and held for 13 hours last December as 
the building was demolished by what he describes as a network of 
corrupt officials and developers. All of its contents were lost. 
 
Mr Qiao’s story is far from unique. Since the mid-1990s, tens of 
millions of Chinese have lost their land. In many cases, only minimal 
compensation has been offered. Researchers believe that, of thousands 
of “mass incidents” of rural unrest occurring each year, the majority are 
about land. In one of the worst recent cases, nine people were killed in 
mid-October in Yunnan province in the south-west in a dispute over 
evictions. 
 
In their campaign for redress, Mr Qiao and his son have been stymied 
at every turn. Local police did not respond when thugs broke the Qiaos’ 
windows. The electricity bureau did nothing when power to his 
building was cut. Planning officials scoffed at his request for adequate 
compensation for the loss of his business. The Qiaos informally 
approached a local court to assess their chances of suing the 
government successfully. They were given a brush-off. 
“The Law at Work: No More Rooms,” ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21629538-against-network-officials-and-
thugs-law-no-shield-no-more-rooms. 
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law.  For example, a treaty could set out guidelines for how and when 
governments should provide compensation for expropriation. Such an 
approach has the benefit of helping not just foreign investors, but 
domestic ones as well.  Canada is famous for having weak 
protections against expropriation.35  The solution to this problem, 
however, is not to grant protections to foreign investors through 
investment and trade agreements.  Rather, it is to give such 
protections to all investors through changes in Canadian law.  In this 
way, trade agreements would be seen as about protection of rights for 
everyone, including ordinary people, rather than just the rich and 
well-connected. 
Second, foreign investors need to take responsibility for their 
business decisions.  There is risk in any investment; there is more risk 
when investing in some countries than in others.  Companies have a 
responsibility to know this and plan for it, and, in fact, it is not hard 
to do so.  Companies that make foreign investments can buy political 
risk insurance; and they can demand arbitration clauses in any foreign 
investment contracts they sign with host governments.  This approach 
addresses the problem without creating an overbroad international 
constitutional system. 
Third, with respect to that international constitutional system, 
we need to think critically about the distinctions between different 
possible international legal obligations in international economic 
agreements.  It is one thing to say that governments should promise 
not to discriminate against each other’s foreign investments.  The 
benefits are clear, and the scope is limited.  It is quite another, 
however, to create a general “due process” type obligation for 
governments, such as “fair and equitable” treatment, that is overseen 
 
 35.  See Mark Milke, Stealth Confiscation: Property Takings via Regulation, 
FRASER FORUM, May/June 2012, at 22, www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/ 
fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research/articles/stealth-confiscation-property-
takings-via-regulations-ff.pdf (“Canada fares poorly in the protection of all sorts of 
property rights protection including, and especially in, the case of regulatory 
takings.”); Bryan P. Schwartz & Melanie R. Bueckert, Regulatory Takings in 
Canada, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 477, 491 (2006) (“The conclusion is 
clear: property rights are minimally protected under the Canadian Constitution. 
Moreover, quasi-constitutional documents such as the Canadian Bill of Rights and 
the Quebec Charter offer minimal protection. As a result, Canadian courts have no 
solid grounds to begin to develop an aggressive ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine.  On 
the contrary, constitutional legal developments have signaled that the protection of 
property rights is ultimately left to democratically elected legislatures. Local 
legislators that fail to work to protect property rights are likely to lose confidence 
among their constituents and to lose the business of potential foreign investors. 
However, judges will not find protections of property rights where none are 
explicitly provided for.”). 
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by international courts.  Such a rule is exceedingly broad in terms of 
the power it shifts from the national to the international, and deserves 
more debate than it has seen so far. 
The international investment law system is at a cross-roads, with 
major debates taking place in the context of the Trans Pacific 
Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.  
These debates will help shape the future of the system and present a 
great opportunity to create a system that matches up with the real 
foreign investment issues of today. 
